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The Near East: Turkey’s Regional Dilemma
February 1, 2016
by Isaac Morales
Admittedly, the term “Near East” is a vestige of a time when European powers labeled the regions
of the world according to their distance from Europe. But the term also captures the very literal
struggle of Turkey to find its place in the world.
The country’s long-fought battle for regional identity has been going on since its first attempt to
join the European Union in 1987. Since then, Turkey has established significant economic ties
with the EU, but it has not been able to attain full membership, and its prospect seems to be in
peril.
According to Germany’s Human Rights Commissioner Christoph Strässer, Turkey’s membership
hinges on its human rights situation. “We need to repeatedly send a compliance reminder to
Ankara. In Turkey, dissenters are punished, and there are attacks against the opposition. As long
as there’s such a thing, the country doesn’t belong in the EU,” Strässer said. Recent reports
of forced deportation of refugees and the rising civilian casualties in the ongoing conflict with
Kurdish separatists may give the EU leaders additional reasons not to admit Turkey.
Aware of the difficulty involved in obtaining an EU membership, Turkey has been strengthening
ties with Saudi Arabia to form a leading partnership in the Middle East. The Saudi Kingdom’s
opposition to Iran’s full and unconditional support of the Syrian regime, along with Turkey’s
deteriorating relationship with Russia due to Moscow’s backing of the Assad regime, make the
two countries ideal partners. While this alliance may distance Turkey from the EU membership, it
may prove beneficial for all those involved.
A notable portion of the recent allegations against Turkey for its human rights situation is attributed
to the influx of Syrian refugees registered in the country, an estimated 2.2 million people who have
fled their war-torn country. The immensity of this humanitarian crisis is such that the EU has
sought Turkey’s assistance in stemming the tide of refugees to Europe and has committed to
sending €3 billion to the country for better monitoring and assisting migrants. Furthermore,
Turkey’s new partnership with Saudi Arabia has resulted in plans to construct schools for Syrian
refugees.
However, aside from the benefits gained from a Turkish-Saudi partnership, there are concerns that
the alliance will result in increased tensions between the Saudi Kingdom and Iran. As suggested
by Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, a member of the opposition party in the Turkish Parliament, rather than
lending support against Iran, Turkey should mediate between the two hostile countries in order to
reduce sectarian violence in the region.
The tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran partially illustrate Turkey’s difficult position. Its
longstanding partnership with the EU is unlikely to dissolve, but it does not appear to be on a path
to full membership. Given the roadblocks that Turkey has faced in attempting to join the EU, its
increasing ties with Saudi Arabia may indicate the country’s new approach to becoming a regional
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player. For human rights advocates, the country’s geopolitical ambitions may unfortunately
overshadow the importance of respecting human rights, both domestically and internationally.
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Article 8 of the Convention to Eliminate All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women: A
Stepping Stone to Ensuring Gender Parity in
International Organs and Tribunals
February 5, 2016
by Claudia Martin*
The GQUAL Campaign appeared before the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (‘CEDAW Committee’ or ‘Committee’) during its last session in
November 2016.[1] In its presentation, GQUAL requested that the CEDAW Committee strengthen
the interpretation and application of Article 8 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women (‘CEDAW’) to ensure gender parity in access to positions in
international organs and tribunals.
Scope of Article 8 of CEDAW
Article 8 of CEDAW requires state parties to the treaty to “take all appropriate measures to ensure
to women, on equal terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent
their Governments at the international level and to participate in the work of international
organizations.” Given the plain text of the provision and its subsequent interpretation by
Convention’s enforcement body, the CEDAW Committee state parties have a duty to ensure
gender equality in the access to positions in international organs and tribunals that play key roles
in developing international law and human rights. As of the end of 2015, 189 states have ratified
the Convention, making the obligations arising out of Article 8 an almost universal requirement.
The goal of GQUAL is to work with states, international bodies, and civil society organizations
towards the effective implementation of this duty.
The obligation to ensure equal opportunity “to participate in the work of international
organizations” under Article 8 is two-fold. At the international level, states must exert influence
when the rules regulating processes of appointment to international positions are adopted to
guarantee that they conform to the gender equality requirements of Article 8. [2] At the domestic
level, states must establish transparent selection processes to ensure that women benefit on an
equal basis from the opportunity to work at the international level, particularly when such
opportunity requires states to nominate candidates to be appointed to those positions. [3] Even
though ensuring gender equality when selecting candidates at the international level is an
obligation of gradual implementation, at the domestic level states have an immediate duty to set
up the necessary conditions to guarantee women de facto equality to access those opportunities.
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Claudia Martin is Co-Director of the Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law at American University
Washington College of Law and a member of the Secretariat of the GQUAL Campaign.
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The reference in Article 8 to “international organizations,” encompasses not only international
bodies such as the United Nations, but also regional organizations, including, for example, the
Organization of American States, the Council of Europe, and the African Union.[4] Moreover, all
organs within those organizations are covered by this obligation, including “courts, subsidiary
bodies, funds and programmes, specialized agencies, and treaty bodies.” [5] Consequently, states
have a duty to ensure gender equality in access to positions at both levels and to all international
organs.
Additionally, Article 8 requires that state parties to the Convention “take all appropriate measures”
to ensure gender equality in their representations to international organizations. According to the
CEDAW Committee, appropriate measures include the creation of objective criteria and processes
for the appointment and promotion of women to relevant positions[6] and the adoption of temporary
special measures aimed at accelerating substantive equality for women,[7] as provided by Article 4
of the Convention.[8] The Committee has read this article to require state parties to adopt temporary
measures such as special educational opportunities, recruitment policies, and quotas in order to
expedite gender de facto equality in areas where women are chronically underrepresented.[9] Such
temporary special measures are necessary to bypass entrenched cultural and structural issues that
make it impossible for women to compete on an even playing field with men.[10]
The CEDAW Committee’s interpretation of the Convention through its Concluding Observations
on state parties and its General Recommendations is vital to understand the practical implications
and obligations of the Convention. Even if Article 8 has not been extensively interpreted, the
CEDAW Committee has repeatedly obligated States to take whatever measures necessary to
ensure de facto gender equality in international representation. Specifically, the Committee has
repeatedly recommended that state parties establish temporary statutory quota systems to achieve
substantive equality in both the diplomatic service and states’ representations to international
organizations.[11] These quotas should be implemented in a similar manner to current quotas
successfully used to reach de facto equality participation in domestic politics and should ensure
that women participate in the highest levels and most vital aspects of the diplomatic service.
Finally, given the precise nature of the obligation to take all appropriate measures, this duty is of
immediate application and may be subject to enforcement through litigation at the domestic and
international jurisdictions.[12]
Conclusion
Article 8 of the Convention clearly establishes a duty to ensure women de facto equality to access
positions at international tribunals and other organs in charge of applying and implementing
international law. This duty is nearly universal because the Convention is one of the most widely
ratified human right treaties. To ensure women participation in the work of international
organizations, states must take action at the international level to guarantee that rules and processes
of appointment to international positions guarantee gender equality. Domestically, states must also
ensure that the process to nominate candidates to those positions, when required, respect the right
of women to access and benefit from those opportunities on an equal basis with men. Moreover,
states must take all the appropriate measures to guarantee women substantive equality [13] to access
those positions, including through the passing of laws setting up objective criteria and processes
for the appointment and promotion of women to international positions and the adoption of
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temporary special measures, in particular quotas, aimed at accelerating substantive equality for
women. The duty to take all the appropriate measures to ensure women de facto equality to
participate in the work of international bodies through the appointment in international tribunals
and similar bodies is of immediate application and may be subject to enforcement at the domestic
and international levels in case of states’ failure to comply.
[1]

For more information on the GQUAL Campaign, please visit http://www.gqualcampaign.org.
Sarah Wittkopp, Article 8, in The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, A Commentary, edited by Marsha A. Freeman, Christine Chinkin, and Beate Rudolf, Oxford Commentaries
on International Law (2013), at 224.
[3]
Id.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Id.
[6]
CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 23, (1997), paras. 38, 50.
[7]
Id., para. 43.
[8]
Article 4 provides: 1. Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto
equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but
shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be
discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved. 2. Adoption by States
Parties of special measures, including those measures contained in the present Convention, aimed at protecting
maternity shall not be considered discriminatory.
[9]
CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 25, (2004), para. 22.
[10]
Id, para. 14.
[11]
See generally, Concluding Observations, the Netherlands, CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/5, February 5, 2010, para. 33;
Concluding Observations, Algeria, CEDAW/C/DZA/CO/3-4, March 23, 2012, para. 26; Concluding Observations,
Tajikistan, CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/4-5, October 29, 2013, para. 22; Concluding Observations, Cambodia,
CEDAW/C/KHM/CO/4-5, October 29, 2013, para. 29; and Concluding Observations, Austria, CEDAW/C/AUT/C)/78, March 22, 2013, para. 31.
[12]
Sarah Wittkopp, Article 8, supra note 3, at 231.
[13]
Substantive equality is understood by the CEDAW Committee as similar to the notion of de facto equality. See,
CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 23, supra note 7.
[2]
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Certifying Responsible Private Security
Companies: Assessing the Implementation of
Transparency and Disclosure Provisions
May 24, 2016
by David Sebstead*
INTRODUCTION
The ANSI/ASIS PSC.1 – 2012 Management System for Quality of Private Security Company
Operations (PSC.1) is a major step forward for assuring that private security companies (PSCs)
adhere to applicable provisions of international human rights and humanitarian law when operating
in complex environments, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and other politically and economically
unstable areas.[i] Despite the progress that the PSC.1 standard represents, there are still many
issues that need to be resolved. An analysis of the public facing components of PSCs’ demonstrable
adherence to PSC.1 indicates significant inconsistency within the private security industry, despite
compliance with the PSC.1 standard being a procurement requirement of the U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DoS) when utilizing private security providers overseas.
The American National Standards Institute and ASIS International created the
PSC.1.[ii] Certification bodies can audit PSCs as a means of demonstrating compliance with the
PSC.1 standard to secure government contracts. Certification to the PSC.1 standard is a privateprivate relationship between a PSC and a private, for-profit, certification body.[iii] This
relationship is problematic because it inherently lacks transparency and sufficient public oversight,
resulting in inconsistent application of the PSC.1 standard. For the standard to be more effective,
PSCs need to apply PSC.1 consistently, and information needs to be accessible to the public
regarding the scope of certification, the PSCs’ statements attesting conformance to the standard,
and the PSCs’ communication of their processes for analyzing human rights risks and receiving
and addressing grievances.
This article examines thirteen PSCs that received their PSC.1 certificates from accredited
certification bodies and details each PSC’s conformance with the four public facing components
of the PSC.1 standard: certificate scope, statement of conformance, risk assessment and
communication, and available grievance mechanisms.[iv] Analysis of the public facing
components of the PSC.1 standard is crucial because the system needs increased transparency.
Transparency is essential because the public and PSCs’ clients need to know if a PSC is actually
adhering to PSC.1’s human rights provisions. Ultimately, this article’s purpose is to utilize this
analysis to highlight best practices for PSCs to improve conformance with PSC.1, increase
transparency and disclosure in the private security industry, and ensure greater respect for human
rights and humanitarian law.

*

David Sebstead is a J.D. Candidate at American University Washington College of Law. David graduated from the
University of Wisconsin – Oshkosh with a B.S. in Political Science and a B.A. in History.
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BACKGROUND
Origins of PSC.1
PSCs are publicly traded or privately owned companies that perform security services in high risk
and complex environments.[v] Over the last few decades, and in particular during the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars, PSCs’ roles in modern conflicts and high-risk environments have dramatically
increased.[vi] With the increased presence of PSCs comes a need for better regulation and
oversight of their activities. The Montreux Document was one of the first major international
agreements that sought to clarify the obligations of states regarding private military and security
companies.[vii] The Montreux Document provides pertinent international legal obligations and
best practices for states, which relate to operations of PSCs during armed conflict.[viii] The
Montreux Document divides states into three, often overlapping, categories: contracting states
(countries that hire PSCs), territorial states (countries on whose territory PSCs operate), and home
states (countries where PSCs are headquartered).[ix] The Montreux Document is not legally
binding, but recalls existing international humanitarian and human rights law obligations that states
must follow concerning the activities of PSCs and details good practices to meet those
obligations.[x]
The Montreux Document was a major step forward in the international regulation of PSCs.
Nevertheless, the Montreux Document has limitations. The Montreux Document only applies in
active armed conflict, and many stakeholders, in particular civil society organizations (CSOs),
were disappointed with the lack of specificity in the Montreux Document and its failure to
incorporate key international human rights and humanitarian law provisions.[xi] Furthermore, the
Montreux Document failed to include the 2008 ‘Protect, Respect, and Remedy’ framework that
the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and other Business Enterprises, Professor John Ruggie, developed.[xii] The ‘Protect,
Respect, and Remedy’ framework provides detailed responsibilities to respect human rights, which
states and businesses should follow when they carry out economic activities.[xiii]
The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) was the second
stage in the Swiss-led effort for the regulation of PSCs. The ICoC articulates specific international
human rights provisions applicable to PSCs in complex and high-risk environments, and it
references the ‘Protect, Respect, and Remedy’ framework.[xiv] The ICoC was adopted in 2010
and was the product of a multi-stakeholder initiative involving various stakeholders, including
PSCs, CSOs, academics, and states.[xv] PSC.1 resulted from efforts to take the principles of the
ICoC and operationalize them into business practice standards. Provisions of the 2010 and 2011
U.S. National Defense Authorization Acts enabled the DoD to fund the development of a third
party certifiable management system standard by ASIS International in consultation with industry
representatives and other stakeholders.[xvi] PSC.1, released in 2012, was the outcome and became
the accepted means for the DoD to differentiate among the quality of security service providers in
making their procurement decisions.
Approximately one year later, in 2013, the Swiss government and other relevant stakeholders
launched the multi-stakeholder International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA) to ensure that
ICoC member PSCs adhere and are accountable to the ICoC.[xvii] A Board and General Assembly
comprised of three equal pillars representing the industry, states, and CSOs govern the Geneva-
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based ICoCA.[xviii] In the summer of 2015, the ICoCA passed a certification procedure that
recognizes certification to PSC.1, along with the submission of additional human rights-related
information, as a pathway to ICoCA certification.[xix]
Purpose of PSC.1
The PSC.1 standard builds on the normative foundations of the Montreux Document and the ICoC,
and provides auditable criteria to ensure the quality provision of private security in a manner
consistent with international human rights and humanitarian law and the national laws of host and
home states.[xx] PSC.1 is a quality assurance and risk management standard that builds on the
plan-do-check-act model of managing operations.[xxi] It is a third party auditable national
management system standard; accredited certification bodies (CBs) can audit a PSC’s
conformance to the standard.[xxii]
PSCs are required to comply with PSC.1 to contract with the DoD and DoS to provide security
services overseas.[xxiii] Although PSCs are required to comply with the standard, they do not
necessarily need to be certified.[xxiv] Ultimately, it is up to procurement specialists to determine
whether a PSC is in compliance.[xxv] In practice, most PSCs have chosen to demonstrate that they
conform to PSC.1 by having an accredited CB certify them.[xxvi] This allows a PSC to secure
government contracts, assure the high quality of its services to clients, and garner reputational and
other benefits related to a demonstrated commitment to respect human rights.
Nature of Certification Relationship
PSCs can obtain a PSC.1 certificate by going through a two-stage audit process with an accredited
CB.[xxvii] Certifications are valid for a three-year period contingent upon successfully passing
interim surveillance audits.[xxviii] National accreditation bodies accredit CBs to conduct audits
and issue certificates.[xxix] Currently, there are only two accredited CBs that can certify to the
PSC.1 standard, MSS Global and Intertek.[xxx] The United Kingdom Accreditation Services
(UKAS) has accredited both of them.[xxxi] Two other CBs, Tsamota Certification Limited and IQ
Verify, are expected to receive their accreditation in 2016 from the ANSI-ASQ National
Accreditation Board and UKAS respectively.[xxxii]
There are several potential issues with PSC.1’s means of certification. One of the principle issues
is the confidential nature of the relationship between two private actors. A CB cannot disclose
specific information about audits without consent from the PSC. While a PSC may choose to
disclose audit-specific information to a government or client upon request, it is unclear if a
government contracting officer has the resources and capabilities to understand and scrutinize such
information, if provided. Most likely, the government contracting officer will accept a PSC.1
certificate on face value. The auditing protocols used by CBs to assess conformance to the PSC.1
standard are proprietary and not disclosed.[xxxiii] Thus, there is no way of knowing what metrics
and measures CBs use to assess conformance with the PSC.1 standard. The information available
to the public is even more circumscribed and provides little means to judge actual conformance
and human rights impacts. The audit process is effectively a black box. This can limit transparency
and result in inconsistent application of the PSC.1 standard.
ANALYSIS
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Research Design and Methodology
This article assesses the public facing components of PSCs’ demonstrated adherence to PSC.1 as
an initial step towards ascertaining the effectiveness of the certification system. The publicly
available information on the websites of thirteen PSCs certified to PSC.1 were analyzed on four
specific
criteria:
the
scope
of
certification,[xxxiv] the
statement
of
conformance,[xxxv] communication of human rights risk analysis,[xxxvi] and methods for
addressing grievances.[xxxvii] The thirteen PSCs include: Academi, Aegis Defense Services,
Britam Defence Ltd, Chenega-Patriot Group, Control Risks Group Ltd, Edinburgh International,
Hart, Garda World Consulting Ltd, G4S Secure Solutions, Olive Group, Reed International,
Sterling, and Triple Canopy.
Chart: Compliance with the Public Facing Components of PSC.1:

The thirteen PSCs were ranked based on the effective implementation of the four public facing
components and were grouped into four categories – very good (3), good (2), fair (1), and poor (0)
– based on the companies’ average performance. Each of the four components were assigned a set
of factors that were indicative of effective implementation of that component. Each factor was
worth one point and the points of those factors were added together for each component. The PSCs
were given 3 points for having most or all of the factors, 2 points for some, 1 point for one or two
factors, and 0 if none of the factors were found. The totals were then averaged and the companies
were then ranked based on their overall numbers.
The factors examined for scope consisted of a downloadable certificate, a clear definition of scope
based on geography or service line, no misleading or ambiguous statements about the scope on the
website or in a press release, and whether the scope of the certificate was global.[xxxviii] The
factors for the grievance mechanism included having a link to a third party complaint mechanism,
a phone number for making complaints, an email for making complaints, policy or procedure
information or contact information in multiple languages, specifically in the official languages of
host states, and a third party complaint process or policy available on the website.[xxxix] The
grievance factors also ensured that the grievance procedure takes into account language,
educational attainment, fear of reprisal, and need for confidentiality.[xl] The factors for the
statement of conformance included a clear statement endorsed by senior management of the PSC
and references to compliance with the ICoC, the Montreux Document, relevant national and local
laws, and relevant international laws.[xli]
9
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The communication of human rights risk assessment component is different from the other factors
because it is unlikely to be available on a website if a PSC is communicating its human rights risks
and its efforts to address these risks to affected stakeholders. This indicator looked at several
factors but was ultimately reduced to a binary determination. The determination was based on
whether there was any indication in statements or policies available on the PSC’s website that
human rights risks are assessed and communicated with relevant stakeholders and particularly
local populations of the host state.[xlii]
Scope of the Certification
The scope of the CB’s certificate is an important public facing indicator for the PSC.1 standard
and indicates what was actually examined by the CB during the auditing process. Scopes can range
from global certification, to more narrow regional or national certifications or certifications based
on specific service lines that the PSC provided.[xliii] The scope can be misleading if the scope is
not made publicly available. A PSC might note that they are PSC.1 certified, but without the scope
of the certification the public and clients do not know the extent of what was audited.
Many of the PSCs studied did well on the scope indicator, because they presented the scope of
their certification clearly. Overall, six of the thirteen PSCs researched had the actual certificate
with a clear scope available on their website. Several other PSCs did not have the certificate
available, but still clearly articulated the scope of their certification through other means, such as
a press release on their website.
However, six PSCs did not provide any information about the scope of their certification. Other
PSCs attempted to outline the scope of their certification, but were unclear. For example, many of
these PSCs outlined the scope of their certification in a press release on their website, which often
contained ambiguous or misleading statements about the scope of their recent certification.
Ultimately, six of the thirteen PSCs studied did not have sufficient information outlining the scope
of their certification.
Although many PSCs do well on the scope component, there is significant room for improvement.
More PSCs should strive to achieve certification with a global scope. So far, based on what is
publicly available on the websites of the researched companies, only three PSCs have global
certification: Aegis Defense Services, Garda World, and Sterling. Clearly providing the scope of
the certification on a website is as simple as posting the actual certificate, and more PSCs should
strive to post the certificate.
Grievance Mechanisms
Providing an adequate means to address third party grievances is an essential measure for
protecting human rights. This is an important public facing component of PSC.1 because it is the
means for impacted stakeholders to lodge complaints against the PSC and have the PSC work with
the complainant to resolve the issue. There are several ways to provide an adequate grievance
mechanism, such as providing a hotline, an email, or a detailed procedure on the PSC’s process
for addressing grievances. Ultimately, the PSC should provide contact information for a third party
to submit a complaint, as well as a basic policy framework outlining the process for resolving
grievances.
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There are several best practices that many PSCs utilize for addressing grievances. Many PSCs
provide a 24-hour hotline and email address. Furthermore, some PSCs, like Edinburgh
International and Triple Canopy, provide grievance information in multiple languages, principally
in the language of the host state. Other PSCs should adopt this practice because issues such as
language barriers should not limit access to the grievance mechanism. Additionally, many PSCs
outline in a policy document on the website the steps that the company will take to resolve the
issue.
Analysis of the thirteen PSCs revealed that there are a number of shortcomings in current practices
and a significant degree of inconsistency among PSCs on the grievance mechanism indicator.
Many PSCs have 24-hour hotlines, but they are not easily accessible on the website. Additionally,
many companies have a hotline or an email, but not both. Furthermore, six PSCs provide detailed
procedures to the public on how the company will address third party complaints. Additionally,
few PSCs have their grievance mechanisms available in the languages of the host states in which
they operate.
PSCs need to do more work on the grievance mechanism indicator. There are some positive points,
but generally a lot of inconsistency among PSCs and among indictors. For example, most PSCs
have an in-house grievance mechanism, while some PSCs, like Sterling, utilize an outside provider
to process complaints. There needs to be more detail from the PSCs in grievance policy procedures,
and the PSCs need to identify and address barriers to accessibility, whether technological,
language, or otherwise.
Statement of Conformance
The statement of conformance is a requirement of the PSC.1 standard and ultimately reflects a
companies’ commitment to respect human rights and relevant laws.[xliv] According to the PSC.1
standard, the statement should mention compliance with the ICoC, the Montreux Document, and
relevant international humanitarian law, human rights, and customary laws and
agreements.[xlv] Furthermore, the senior management of the company should endorse the
statement and communicate it internally and externally to stakeholders.
Most of the PSCs examined tended to do well on the statement of conformance indicator with nine
out of the thirteen PSCs sorted into the highest category for the statement of conformance
component. Seven PSCs had a code of conduct that was publicly available on the website.
Additionally, there was usually clear evidence that there was an endorsement of the code of
conduct from the senior management. Companies like Reed International, Britam Defence, and
Garda World Consulting had a clear endorsement from the senior management on their codes of
conduct. Some companies, like Garda World Consulting and Britam, even had separate detailed
human rights policies that were available on the website.
When companies struggled with the statement of conformance indicator it was usually because
there was a lack of detailed information or no information available on human rights. Some
companies, like Sterling, mentioned environmental impact, but failed to mention adverse impacts
on human rights. Furthermore, some companies failed to explicitly mention compliance with key
documents like the Montreux Document or the ICoC.
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More PSCs need to have a clear statement of conformance available to the public on their websites.
Although most companies usually provide a statement, the statements often lack detail and
specificity. Although many companies do well on this indicator, there is still room for
improvement; for example, PSCs can provide an explicit commitment to abide by the relevant
provisions of international human rights and humanitarian law.
Communication of Risk Analysis
The communication of risk analysis is basically any mention of a human rights risk assessment
that the PSC makes available on the website. The measure was a binary yes or no, as opposed to
the other three components’ factors. The research design used a binary answer because it is
unlikely to be available on a website whether and how relevant risk information is communicated
to specific stakeholders as required in PSC.1. The study looked for any indication that PSCs were
assessing human rights risks.
Seven PSCs did mention that a human rights risk assessment was of a fundamental importance in
their codes of conduct. However, even when PSCs mentioned the risk assessment it was often
vague. No PSC provided details in terms of what that risk assessment process actually entails or
methodologies used. While some companies like Britam Defence and Garda World do well on this
component, most PSCs do not provide enough information to ascertain that a human rights risk
assessment is a core part of their risk management process. More explicit references to a human
rights risk assessment are required, as well as details about that process and efforts to involve
affected stakeholders.
CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS
Many unanswered questions remain about the PSC.1 standard. Principally, is there enough
transparency in the system to assess which are the more socially responsible security providers?
Most of the PSCs in the study were in the fair category with six out of thirteen PSCs being placed
in the fair to moderate range, four out of thirteen were sorted into the good category, and three
PSCs were sorted into the poor category. This demonstrates a general lack of transparency in the
system because key information that the PSCs should provide is unavailable to the public and
clients, who cannot know if the company is truly in compliance with relevant human rights laws.
Furthermore, the decentralized and privatized certification system might not be the most effective
means for enhancing conformance to the human rights-related provisions of the PSC.1 standard.
There was a great amount of inconsistency between companies and even between CBs. The current
system lacks adequate direct oversight and may not be effective enough to ensure full conformance
with human rights and humanitarian law by all certified PSCs.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the actual impacts of PSC.1 certification on human rights
protections have yet to be fully determined. Most of what is being shared publicly, and assessed
by CBs, are policies and processes. There is no systematic assessment of actual human rights
impacts across PSCs’ global operations or of cumulative impacts of multiple PSCs’ activities in
one area of operation. Embedding a commitment to respect human rights in management systems
is an important first step, but adequately identifying and mitigating actual human rights impacts
on the ground in host states where PSCs operate is essential.
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